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JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY
Department Editor: Francis T. Crowe*
LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE OF AIR PASSENGERS
D ATA recently released on the aviation underwriting practices of 100
United States life insurance companies reveals a definitely progressive
trend in the outlook of these important organizations on the safety and
future of travel by air. The figures in Tables 1 and 2 reflect this develop-
ment, and show in dollars and cents the extent of the vast improvement which
has occurred since 1918. This is encouraging in light of the past inflexibili-
ties reflected below.
At the end of World War I, insurance companies were faced with a con-
tinually increasing number of claims for death incurred through air travel.
With no basis in experience for actuarial figures, and in fear of the danger
of the new transportation, the companies almost without exception refused
coverage to the air passenger in new life insurance policies. The efforts of
the companies to define the risks to be excluded from coverage led to clauses
varying widely in content and still more widely in judicial interpretation.,
And when continued expansion of airline travel and steady reduction of
passenger fatalities induced the companies to extend coverage to passengers
on scheduled commercial flights, the clauses became even more susceptible
of varying interpretations. An examination of the cases indicates that the
confusion in the courts still exists, at least as regards policies issued prior
to the 1940's.
The earliest risk exclusion clauses were almost uniformly to the effect
that "participation in aviation" or "engaging in aviation," with the word
"aeronautics" occasionally substituted for "aviation," was a risk not cov-
ered by the policy. The interpretations of these clauses, though not uniform,
until about the middle 1930's held that one who rode merely as a passenger
was "participating," but was not "engaging." Thus, a "participating"
clause precluded recovery on the policy, while an "engaging" clause did not.
"Participating" was held to mean "to have a part of"2 and a passenger was
thought to come within that definition. "Engaging" was early thought to
connote more habitual activity than an occasional passenger ride, as well as
indicating an occupational participation, as pilot or crewman.
But these interpretations were by no means uniformly accepted until the
late 1930's. At that time the courts began to interpret even "participating"
as meaning something more than the activity of a mere passenger,' and the
cases today involving clauses with either "participating" or "engaging"
quite uniformly hold for recovery by the beneficiary.4 Those clauses that
excluded "participating" or "engaging in aeronautic operations or expedi-
tions" are even more apt to lead to recovery on the policy. The Dyess case,5
*Student Editor, Northwestern University Legal Publications Board.
1 Glass, Aeronautic Risk Exclusion in Life Insurance Contracts 7 J. Air L.
305 (1936).
2 Bew v. Travelers Insurance Co., 95 N.J.L. 533, 112 Atl. 859 (1921).
3 Mutual Benefit Health & Ace. Ass'n v. Bowman, 99 F. (2d) 856 (C.C.A.
8th 1938); Mutual Benefit Health & Ace. Ass'n v. Moyer, 94 F. (2d) 906 (C.C.A.
9th 1938); Mass. Protect. Ass'n v. Bayersdorfer, 105 F. (2d) 595 (C.C.A. 6th
1939) ; Chappell v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 120 W. Va. 262, 197 S.E. 723 (1938).
4Lee v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 46 N.Y.S. (2d) 241 (1944); Funk v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 60 N.Y.S. (2d) 349 (1946).
5 "If a novitiate boarded an unbroken mustang, it would doubtless prove to be
a hazardous event, but would not accurately be spoken of as an 'expedition'."
Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Dyess, 194 Ark. 1023, 109 S.W. (2d) 1263 (1937).
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decided in 1937, held that "operations" required more activity than found
in a passenger, and that an "expedition" was more than just a hazardous
event. Clauses limited to excluding "participating or engaging in aviation
or aeronautics," and those that add the words "operations" or "expeditions,"
are quite uniformly interpreted in favor of the insured passenger.0
That unanimity ceases, however, as soon as other qualifying words are
used. An early attempt to bring the mere passenger within the exclusion
was the use of the words "as passenger or otherwise." That usage has
caused more variance in judicial interpretation than any other. A most
striking example of the divergent interpretations is afforded by two cases
involving identical fact situations, National Bank of Commerce v. New
York Life Insurance Co. 7 and Ivy v. New York Life Insurance Co.8 In each
case the insured was killed in a crash while flying as a fare-paying passenger
on a regular airline flight. The exclusion clauses involved were substan-
tially identical, to the effect that the benefits of the policy would not be paid
for death resulting from "engaging as a passenger or otherwise in aeronautic
operations." In the National Bank case the court held that if the clause had
been only "engaging in aeronautic operations" the passenger clearly would
not have been excluded. And, said the court, the passenger must first come
within the general description of "engaging in - operations" before the
words "as passenger or otherwise" can come into play.
A mere passenger not taking a part in the operation of the craft is not
excluded and the beneficiary may recover. In the Ivy case the qualification
was more effective. The court held that if the clause had merely excluded
"engaging in operations" the insured would not have been excluded, but the
use of the extra words clearly brings the passenger within the scope of the
exclusion. The Christen case, 9 decided in a United States District Court,
in Illinois, involved substantially the same clause and fact situation as these
two cases and the result was in line with the Ivy decision.
It is difficult to choose between the two opposite results reached in these
cases. It seems obvious at first glance that the words "as passenger or
otherwise" would be clear enough to exclude all passengers whether partici-
pating in operations or not; yet there are good arguments to support the
view that such a clause means only those passengers who are actually taking
some part in the operation of flying.' 0 Clearly a passive passenger is in no
sense operating the plane; nor would a prospective insurance buyer think
of himself as "engaging in aeronautics" 11 if he were to be a mere passen-
ger. Quite obviously, the courts have had difficulty with this. Of ten cases
decided since 1936 in which the words "as passenger or otherwise" have been
of major significance, five have allowed recovery and five have denied it to
the beneficiary. 12
6 Cases cited in notes 4, 5, 6, supra.
7 Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. New York Life Ins. Co., 181 Tenn. 299, 181 S.W.
(2d) 151 (1944).
8 Ivy v. New York Life Ins. Co., 33 F. Supp. 841 (DC ND Ala. SD 1940).
9 Christen v. New York Life Ins. Co., 19 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1937).
10 This view is strengthened by the fact that the risk is greater and more
apt to be excluded where the passenger takes part in the operation, while a mere
fare-paying passenger is a lesser risk. Further weight to this view is added by
the fact that those companies that do extend coverage to fare-paying passengers
on regular airlines do so without appreciable additional cost. Nat'l Bank v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 181 Tenn. 299, 181 S.W. (2d) 151 (1944).
11 Hartol v. Prudential Ins. Co., 290 N.Y. 44, 47 N.E. (2d) 687 (1943).
12 Recovery permitted: Hartol Products Corp. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 290
N.Y. 44, 47 N.E. (2d) 687 (1943); Funk v. New York Life Ins. Co., 60 N.Y.S.
(2d) 349 (1946); Lee v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 46 N.Y.S. (2d) 241 (1944);
Equit. Life Assur. Soc. v. Dyess, 194 Ark. 1023, 109 S.W. (2d) 1263 (1937);
Recovery denied: Christen v. New York Life Ins. Co., 19 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill.
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In light of the decisions, it is apparent that use of the words "engaging
in operations" combined with "as passenger or otherwise" makes for am-
biguity. It is significant that in all five cases in which recovery has been
allowed, notwithstanding the exclusion clause, the courts have relied to
some extent on the doctrine than any ambiguity in an insurance contract
will be construed strictly against the insurer. 13 In fact, as one writer noted
in 1936,14 this doctrine is recognized in almost all cases in which the bene-
ficiary is allowed to recover.
Where the exclusion clause has not included any of the words that have
given so much trouble, as "engaging," "participating," and "operations,"
"expeditions," and has been composed of words more descriptive of the status
of a mere passenger, 15 the insurance companies have defended more suc-
cessfully. In fact, under these exclusion clauses recovery has been pre-
cluded under some rather unusual circumstances. In the Barringer case, 16
involving a clause limiting liability if death "resulted from riding in any
aircraft," the insured was an Army major en route as a passenger in an army
plane from Puerto Rico to Trinidad. His plane flew out over the ocean and
was never heard from again. In the Rossman case17 a pilot of a small plane
made a forced landing safely on the water 50 feet from shore. He was
drowned in the cold water before he could reach shore. The clause that
precluded recovery read "... as a result, directly, or indirectly, of travel or
flight in any aircraft." In the Richardson case,' 8 a clause that read "not
liable for death .. . caused by an aerial conveyance" precluded recovery
when the insured was forced to jump in his parachute when the fog bound
plane in which he was a passenger ran out of gas. His parachute failed to
open. Said the court, "It was the airplane that placed this unfortunate
individual 3500 feet in the air."
In three other cases, the courts have denied recovery under circumstances
equally removed from the flight itself. In two cases 19 the clauses were al-
most identical, that there would be no liability for death from "participation
in aeronautics"; in the third20 there would be no liability for death from
"engaging as a passenger or otherwise in aeronautic operations." In all
three cases there was indisputable evidence, eye witness accounts in two of
the three cases, that the insured had gotten safely out of the airplane after
forced landings on the water and that death occurred solely from drowning.
1937); Nat'l Exchange Bank v. New York Life Ins. Co., 19 F. Supp. 790 (W.D.
Pa. 1937) ; Ivy v. New York Life Ins. Co., 33 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Ala. 1940) ; Reed
v. Home State Life Ins. Co., 186 Okla. 226, 97 P. (2d) 53 (1939); Beveridge v.
Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 120 W. Va. 256, 197 S.E. 721 (1938).
"3 29 Am. Jur. 180, Insurance §166. "If insurer meant to exclude ... liability,
why didn't it say so plainly so that any wayfaring man, though a fool, might not
be deceived thereby." Equit. Life Assur. Soc. v. Dyess, 194 Ark. 1023, 109 S.W.
(2d) 1263 (1937).
14 Glass, op. cit. supra in note 1, at 328.
15 Not using words engaging, participating, expeditions, or operations. Re-
placed by clause similar to ". . . from operating, or riding in, any kind of air-
craft," or ". . . service, travel or flight in any species of aircraft."
16 Barringer v. Prudential Ins. Co., 153 F. (2d) 224 (C.C.A. 3d 1946).
17 Rossman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 71 F. Supp. 592 (S.D. Me. 1947);
Accord, Green v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 144 F. (2d) 55 (C.C.A. 1st 1944).
18 Richardson v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 228 Iowa 319, 291 N.W.
408 (1940); Accord, Knouse v. Equit. Life Ins. Co., 163 Kan. 213, 181 P. (2d)
310 (1947).
19 Neel v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 131 F. (2d) 159 (C.C.A. 2d 1942); King v.
Order of United Commercial Travelers, 65 F. Supp. 740 (W.D. S.C. 1946). The
fact that in these cases the insured had been the pilot is immaterial since their
activity in the plane had nothing to do with their death.
20 Hart v. New England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 1943 USAvR 38, (N.D. Cal.
1942).
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The fact that none of these three clauses includes language as wide as that
in the others cited makes the result even more interesting.
A contrary result was reached in Bull v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada,21
where the beneficiary under a policy containing one of the more efficacious
clauses, but no military exclusion clause, was allowed to recover. The in-
sured, unharmed himself, had been shot down in his navy plane and while
attempting to inflate his life raft was killed by gunfire from a strafing Jap
plane. The court said "aviation may have been a contributing cause, but
that did not make death an indirect result of aviation. No risk of aviation
resulted in death. A risk of war resulted in death."
Of particular interest in the past few years have been decisions inter-
preting policies on men killed in service.22 Generally, exclusion clauses that
would have relieved the company of liability for death in civilian passenger
flights were held also to preclude recovery for death on military flights. Of
special significance among these cases are five in which there were no
clauses excluding recovery because of military flights. This fact precludes
any thought that the courts might have interpreted the aviation and the
military exclusion clauses together. In fact, one policy contained an express
provision, "This policy is free of conditions as to ... military... service. '23
But it had an exclusion clause against liability for death from ". . . riding
in any kind of aircraft... ." The beneficiary contended that the company
was charged with knowledge that the insured might enter the military air
service and be killed in military flight and that the insured was not excluded
from coverage in such flight. The court held otherwise and found for the
company.
There are, however, three cases2 4 involving military air travel deaths
where recovery has been allowed under circumstances which make them
irreconcilable with the others. The Schifter case is in conflict with the
Durland decision cited above. In the latter, the company had expressly
stated that the policy was free from conditions as to military service, yet
recovery was precluded under the aeronautical exclusion clause. In the
Schifter case, which contained an aeronautical exclusion clause, the com-
pany had agreed by a rider on the policy that the coverage of the policy
would continue ". . . regardless of those provisions which except from pay-
ment any claims arising where he has entered the armed forces of the
Nation in time of war. . . ." Here the court followed the line of reasoning
of the beneficiary in the Durland case, that the company knew the insured
might go into the air force, and allowed recovery on the policy.
As a result of the tremendous increase in passenger travel on regular
airlines and because of the great increase in safety, many insurance com-
21 Bull v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 141 F. (2d) 456 (C.C.A. 7th 1944). "... death
as result of service, travel or flight in any species of aircraft .. ."
2 2 Barringer v. Prudential Ins. Co., 153 F. (2d) 224 (C.C.A. 3d 1946); Bull
v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 141 F. (2d) 456 (C.C.A. 7th 1944); Green v. Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 144 F. (2d) 55 (C.C.A. 1st 1944); Burns v. Mutual Benefit Life, 79 F.
Supp. 847 (W.D. Mich. 1948); Hyfer v. Metropolitan Life, 318 Mass. 175, 61 N.E.
(2d) 3 (1945); Schifter v. Commercial Travelers, 50 N.Y.S. (2d) 376 (1944);
Quinones v. Life Cas. Ins. Co., 209 La. 76, 24 So. (2d) 270 (1945); Knouse v.
Equit. Life, 163 Kan. 213, 181 P. (2d) 310 (1947) ; Durland v. New York Life, 61
N.Y.S. (2d) 700 (1946); Conaway v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 148 Ohio St. 598, 76
N.E. (2d) 284 (1947); Richardson v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 228
Iowa 319, 291 N.W. 408 (1940).
2 3 Durland v. New York Life, 61 N.Y.S. (2d) 700 (1946).
24 Schifter v. Commercial Tray. Mut., 50 N.Y.S. (2d) 408 (1944) ; Conaway
v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 148 Ohio St. 598, 76 N.E. (2d) 284 (1947); Bull v. Sun
Life Assur., 141 F. (2d) 456 (C.C.A. 7th 1944).
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panies have begun writing their ordinary life insurance policies to cover
the insured while he is a "fare-paying passenger" on a licensed, regularly
scheduled airline.25 Two recent cases have litigated the question of what
is a "fare-paying passenger" under these clauses. The-results are in con-
flict, recovery being allowed where it appears that it should be denied, and
vice versa. In the Quinones case26 an army officer was riding a civilian
transport DC-2 type plane, used to transport army personnel and supplies.
Its pilot was an army pilot. The court decided there was nothing in the
policy to distinguish between military and civilian aircraft, nor between
military and civilian airfields so long as they were "definitely established."
And since a civilian employee riding at his employer's expense would cer-
tainly be a "fare-paying passenger" this army officer riding at the expense
of his "employer" was also a "fare-paying passenger." Recovery was al-
lowed. In the Krause case27 insured was riding in a TWA plane on a pass.
The regular fare was $94.03. Insured had paid an $8.00 service charge and
was thenceforth treated as a passenger so far as anything pertinent to life
insurance coverage was concerned. When he was killed in a crash it was
held that "fare-paying passenger" meant one who had paid the legal, or full,
fare. These two decisions are somewhat incongruous when the purpose of
the "fare-paying passenger" qualification is recognized as being to limit
liability to the safest of air transport, the certificated air carriers.
In an article dated 1936, one writer offered as the least ambiguous, most
efficacious means of clearly defining the risk excluded the following clause28 :
"Death resulting directly or indirectly from service or travel while in, on,
or near, as a passenger or otherwise, any vehicle or mechanical device for
aerial flight or ascension." The lapse of twelve years has proven him a good
prophet. In cases involving exclusion clauses similar to this the insurance
companies have fared much better than in the early ones. There is this
qualification to be suggested, that the use of the words "... as a passenger
or otherwise" has not been as helpful as it would appear they might be.
The elimination of the more restrictive words "engaging" and "participat-
ing," "operations" and "expeditions" has done more xo clarify the limits of
liability than anything else. The insurance companies still face a number
of years in which they can expect claims on old policies issued at a time
when those words were used, and almost without exception the courts have
treated insurance contracts as subject to interpretation, not as of the day
they were written, but in the light of current conditions. 29
Probably the reluctance of insurance companies to extend coverage to
air passengers was understandable to begin with. The fatality rate as late
as 1930 was 28.6 per 100,000,000 passenger miles,80 far above that of other
transportation. To cover such passengers might have required a premium
increase in ordinary life insurance policies that would have made their sale
difficult. But by 1935 the rate had dropped amazingly to 4.8 per 100,000,000
25 One of the most common clauses is "from operating, or riding in, any kind
of aircraft except as a fare-paying passenger in a licensed passenger aircraft
operated by a licensed pilot on a rhgular passenger route between definitely estab-
lished airports."
2 6 Quinones v. Life & Cas. Ins., 209 La. 76, 24 So. (2d) 270 (1945).27 Krause v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 141 Nebr. 844, 5 N.W. (2d) 229
(1942). Cf. Burns v. Mut. Ben. Life, 79 F. Supp. 847 (W.D. Mich. 1948).
28 Glass, op. cit. supra in note 1, 305, 583.
29 Id. at 333. Mass. Protect. Ass'n v. Bayersdorfer, 105 F. (2d) 595 (C.C.A.
6th 1939); Marks v. Mut. Life Ins., 96 F. (2d) 267 (C.C.A. 9th 1838); King v.
Equit. Life Assur. Soc., 232 Iowa 541, 5 N.W. (2d) 845 (1942).
30 Kelly, Aviation and Insurance, Address to The International Claim Ass'n
at Chateau Frontenac, Quebec, Canada, p. 2 (1946).
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passenger miles8 ' and by 1945 to 2.14 per 100,000,000.32 Yet in 1935 only
4 companies, out of 104 questioned, extended coverage to the airline passen-
ger in ordinary life policies, and in 1945, when passenger fatalities numbered
less per passenger mile than in automobiles,3 only 68 of those 104 com-
panies insured airline passengers in their ordinary life policies. 4 One
wonders why it is not now common practice to insure the airline passenger
without exception as to travel on scheduled flights. In the eight years from
1941 through 1948 the fatality rate per passenger mile in airline travel has
been lower than that of the automobile in all but two years, 1942 and 1947,85
yet no insurance company excludes death from auto accident as an insurance
risk.
It seems reasonable to suggest that scheduled air travel has attained a
safety status that leaves insurance companies with no real justification for
further exclusion. Indeed, granting a technical legal right to contract only
for those risks they wish to cover, the insurance companies may well be said
to have a public duty in this matter. The average insurance purchaser is
relatively inexperienced in reading the fine print in voluminous contracts
and beyond one or two obviously necessary exclusions, such as death by
suicide or war risk, it appears that companies have a duty to keep the terms
as simple as possible. What average man today would question, as he steps
aboard a nationally known airline plane, that his family would benefit from
his life insurance policy if he were killed? Let the reader ask himself if his
policies would cover him as an airline passenger.
THOMAS A. MAmt*
31 Ibid.
32 A.T.A.'s Air Transport Facts & Figures (10th Ed.), 9.
33 Ibid.
34 Kelly, op. cit. supra note 30, at p. 3.
35 Op. cit. supra note 32. See also ACCIDENT FACTS (1948 Ed.), 77.
* Student, Northwestern Law School, Competitor Legal Publication Board.
